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Abstract—While showing great promise, Bitcoin requires users
to wait tens of minutes for transactions to commit – even
then offering only probabilistic guarantees. This work introduces
ByzCoin, a novel Byzantine consensus protocol that leverages
scalable collective signing to commit Bitcoin transactions irre-
versibly within seconds. ByzCoin achieves Byzantine consensus
while preserving Bitcoin’s open membership by dynamically
forming hash power-proportionate consensus groups representing
recently-successful block miners. ByzCoin employs communica-
tion trees and achieves a throughput of up to 975 transactions per
second (TPS), which is more than Paypal currently handles, with
confirmation latencies of 15-20 seconds while mitigating double
spending and selfish mining attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The original Bitcoin paper [1] argues that transaction
processing is secure and irreversible as long as the largest
colluding group of miners represents less than 50% of the
total computing capacity and at least about one hour has
elapsed. This high transaction confirmation latency limits
Bitcoin’s suitability for real-time transactions. Later work
revealed additional vulnerabilities to transaction reversibility,
double-spending, and strategic mining attacks [2], [3].
The key problem is that Bitcoin’s consensus algorithm
provides weak, propabilistic consistency rather than strong.
Strong consistency could offer cryptocurrencies three impor-
tant benefits. First, all miners agree on the validity of blocks
right away, without wasting computational power resolving
inconsistencies (forks). Second, clients need not wait extended
periods for certainty that a submitted transaction is committed.
As soon as it appears in the blockchain, the transaction can
be considered confirmed. Third, strong consistency provides
forward security: as soon as a block has been appended to the
blockchain, it stays there forever. While strong consistency for
cryptocurrencies has been suggested before [4], existing pro-
posals give up Bitcoin’s decentralization, introduce new and
non-intuitive security assumptions, and/or lack experimental
evidence of performance and scalability.
This work introduces ByzCoin [5], a Bitcoin-like cryptocur-
rency enhanced with strong consistency based on the princi-
ples of the well-studied Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT) [6] algorithm. ByzCoin addresses three key challenges
in bringing PBFT-based strong consistency to cryptocurren-
cies: (1) open membership, (2) scalability to hundreds of
replicas, and (3) transaction commit rate.
II. BYZCOIN DESIGN
We start with a group of n = 3f + 1 PBFT replicas–the
trustees–that has been fixed and globally agreed upon upfront
and where f denotes the maximum number of faulty replicas.
Prior work has suggested essentially such a design [4], though
without addressing the scalability challenges it creates. Under
these simplified assumptions PBFTCoin guarantees safety and
liveness, since at most f nodes are faulty and thus the usual
BFT security bounds apply. Subsequently we address these
restrictions, transforming PBFTCoin into ByzCoin.
A. Opening the Consensus Group
Removing PBFTCoin’s assumption of a closed consensus
group of trustees presents two conflicting challenges. On the
one hand, conventional BFT relies on a well-defined consensus
group to guarantee safety and liveness. On the other hand,
Sybil attacks [7] can break any open-membership protocol
involving security thresholds, such as PBFT’s assumption that
at most f out of 3f + 1 members are honest.
Bitcoin employs a mechanism already suited to this prob-
lem: proof-of-work mining. We adapt this technique into a
proof-of-membership mechanism with the goal to maintain the
“balance of power” within the BFT consensus group over a
given fixed-size sliding share window. Each time a miner finds
a new block, it receives a share which proves the miner’s
membership in the group of trustees and the share window is
moved one step forward. Each miner wields “voting power”
of a number of shares equal to the number of blocks the miner
has successfully mined within the current window. Assuming
collective hash power is relatively stable, this implies that
within a window, each active miner wields a number of shares
statistically proportionate to the amount of hash power that
miner has contributed during this time period.
Since we can no longer assume voluntary participation, we
need an incentive for nodes to obtain shares and remain active.
For this purpose, we adopt Bitcoin’s existing incentives of
mining rewards and transaction fees – but instead of these
rewards all going to the miner of the last block, we split a
block’s rewards and fees across all members of the current
consensus group, in proportion to the number of shares.
B. Replacing MACs by Scalable Collective Signing
In our next refinement step towards ByzCoin, we tackle
the scalability challenge caused by PBFT’s non-transferrable
MAC-based message authentication. By adopting digital sig-
natures for authentication, we remove the necessity that all
trustees communicate directly with each other and are able
to use sparser and more scalable communication topologies
enabling the current leader to collect and distribute third-party
verifiable evidence that certain steps in PBFT have succeeded.
By relying on tree-based communication structures [8], we can
reduce communication complexity from O(n2) to O(n).
Even with signatures providing transferable authentication,
it is costly for the leader to distribute 1000 digital signatures
and wait for everyone to verify them. To tackle this challenge
we build on the CoSi protocol [9] for collective signing (co-
signing). CoSi does not implement consensus or BFT, but
offers a primitive to implement prepare and commit messages
during PBFT rounds. We implement a single ByzCoin round
using two sequential CoSi rounds initiated by the current
leader. The leader’s announcement of the first CoSi round
implements the pre-prepare and the generated co-signature
implements the prepare phase of PBFT which ensures that
a proposal can be committed consistently, but is insufficient
to ensure that the proposal will be committed. The leader
and/or some number of other members could fail before a
supermajority of nodes learn about the successful prepare
phase. The leader therefore initiates a second CoSi round
to implement the PBFT protocol’s commit phase, in which
the leader obtains attestations that all the signing members
witnessed the successful result of the prepare phase and make
a positive commitment to remember the decision. This co-
signature resulting from this second CoSi round effectively
attests that a supermajority of members not only considers
the leader’s proposal “safe” but promises to remember it,
and hence that the leader’s proposal has committed. Finally,
CoSi allows us to reduce the communication complexity even
further from O(n) to O(log n).
C. Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election
While ByzCoin so far provides a scalable guarantee of
strong consistency, ensuring that clients wait only for the next
block, the time they still have to wait between blocks may
nevertheless be significant. While ByzCoin’s strong consis-
tency might in principle make it “safe” from a consistency
perspective to increase block mining rate, doing so could still
exacerbate liveness and other performance issues, just as in
Bitcoin. To enable lower client-perceived transaction latencies
we build on the idea of Bicoin-NG [10] to decouple the
functions of transaction verification from leader election and
consensus group membership.
As in Bitcoin-NG, we use two different kinds of blocks.
The first, microblocks represent transactions to be stored and
committed. The current leader creates a new microblock every
few seconds and uses the CoSi-based PBFT protocol above
to commit and collectively sign it. The other type of block,
keyblocks, are mined via proof-of-work and serve to elect
leaders and create shares. This decoupling allows the current
leader to propose and commit many microblocks, containing
many smaller batches of transactions, within a keyblock min-
ing period. Unlike Bitcoin-NG, in which a malicious leader
could rewrite history or double-spend within this period until
the next keyblock, ByzCoin ensures that each microblock
is irreversibly committed regardless of the current leader’s
behavior. In Bitcoin-NG one blockchain includes both types
of blocks, which introduces a race condition for miners, as
microblocks are created, the miners have to change the header
of their keyblocks to mine on top of the latest microblock.
In ByzCoin, in contrast, the blockchain becomes two sep-
arate parallel blockchains. The main blockchain consists of
all minded keyblocks. The microblocks form a secondary
blockchain which depends on the primary to identify the era
in which every microblock belongs. An overview on the final
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Fig. 1. Overview on the ByzCoin design
ByzCoin design is given in Figure 1.
III. EVALUATION
We have written a working prototype of ByzCoin1 in the Go
programming language [11] and evaluated it on DeterLab [12],
using 36 physical machines that run up to 28 separate ByzCoin
processes. To mimic a realistic wide-area network environment
we imposed a round-trip latency of 200ms between any two
machines and a link bandwidth of 35Mbps per simulated host.
The results of our experiments show a maximum throughput of
975TPS for a group of 148 miners. Furthermore, we measured
signing latencies between 15 seconds, for 1MB blocks, and 2
minutes, for 16MB blocks.
Moreover, ByzCoin also mitigates double-spending and
network partitioning attacks [2], [3], since an attacker would
need to forge co-signatures to pre-compute or falsify blocks.
We refer to [5] for a more thorough discussion of our
implementation results and a preliminary security analysis.
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